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International investment law is dynamic. As treaty practice and jurisprudence 
in the area constantly develop, global standards are always in the making. 
Rethinking Ethiopia’s Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) is thus a natural 
response to evaluate the status of the country’s obligations under the regime of 
global investment standards. This article briefly evaluates the concept of Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) treatment, in relation to the nature or purpose of MFN 
clauses and its interaction with dispute resolution provisions contained in BITs. 
In doing so, the article evaluates the different scenarios of ‘treaty shopping’ 
whereby an investor can possibly use BITs signed by Ethiopia and a state other 
than the investor’s home state, to benefit from treaty obligations entered by 
Ethiopia with other partners. A review of Ethiopian BITs indicate that in almost 
all of the BITs, the MFN clause is phrased in general terms and leaves leverage 
to raise competing interpretations and creating a matrix of obligations thereby 
stretching the country’s obligations under the respective agreements. This calls 
for revising the broad and incoherent application of the MFN standard 
contained in various BITs signed by Ethiopia with the aim to laying down a 
coherent investment treaty framework.
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Introduction
International investment law is one of the most dynamic fields of international 
economic law. It is also one of the fields of international law discourse that is 
subject to continuous policy debate. This comes as no surprise considering the 
growing importance being given to protecting the flow of international 
investment and how deeply its contents are inserted in domestic policy making 
processes. The system is also influenced by the dynamics of globalization and 
global governance, and by various economic reforms resulting in investment 
disputes. In effect, the rules and principles of the regime are a flux. Treaty 
practice and jurisprudence in the area constantly develop and global standards 
are always in the making. Rethinking Ethiopia’s Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) within this context is thus a natural response to evaluate the status of the 
country’s obligations under the regime of evolving global investment standards.
However, it will be a disservice to attempt to evaluate the entire framework 
of BITs signed by Ethiopia in such short article. Rather, for the moment, the 
authors chose to examine one of the topical and hotly debated issues in the area; 
the dynamism in relation to the concept of Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
treatment. In particular the article addresses the nature and purpose of the clause 
and its interaction with dispute resolution provisions contained in BITs by 
taking recent developments in international investment dispute settlement. 
Generally the aim of this article is to show how recent application of MFN 
provision contained in basic treaty to benefit an investor from dispute settlement 
provisions contained in another comparator treaty is paving new grounds of 
application of the standard with the effect of stretching the country’s obligations 
under the respective agreements.
The article thus attempts to elucidate the policy coherence pursued in this 
line. In making this evaluation, an attempt is made to review all BITs signed by 
Ethiopia and important international jurisprudence on the issue. In the 
meantime, it is also to be seen that case law and academic literature on the topic 
present constantly diverging stream of opinion. Thus, while the article attempts 
to be comprehensive in this regard, it does not claim to cover all ground.
The first section of the article provides a general observation on the 
development of BITs, by also putting the Ethiopian experience in context. 
Section Two discusses the nature, purpose and scope of the MFN clause in 
International Investment Agreements and also introduces the debate on its scope 
of application to and its interaction with dispute resolution provisions contained 
in BITs, which is the main subject matter of this article. Section Three deals 
with the types of MFN questions raised in the debate in the context of the rules 
contained under BITs sighed by Ethiopia. And finally, some observations of 
arbitral practice are highlighted in Section Four with a brief conclusion in the 
end.
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1. General Observation on the Development of BITs
Foreign investors are normally exposed to different and less known environment 
of the host country with its different culture and traditions, ideology,
bureaucracy, legal system and political infrastructures, as well as a specific
vulnerability to interference by the Host State.1 In order to mitigate the 
susceptibility of the foreign investor from the challenges that can be 
encountered in an unknown and unfamiliar system, certain mechanisms have 
been introduced through time. These mechanisms include diplomatic protection 
by the home state of the investor, the obligation under customary international 
law of host states to respect foreign investment, observation of the legal 
restrictions regarding procedures and compensation upon expropriation, 
arbitration of investment disputes as provided in multilateral and bilateral 
investment treaties, in national investment laws, and in the investment 
agreement of parties as well as enforcement procedures before state courts.2 
Investment contracts that are signed between the investor and an entity of the 
host state also extend protection to the foreign investor.
Regarding the level of acceptability of some of these measures by the foreign 
investors, using Host state courts is not acceptable to many investors as relying 
on host country law alone will subject foreign investment capital to various 
risks. One risk is the danger that Host countries may easily change the law after 
an investment is made, and host government officials responsible for applying 
the local law may not always act impartially toward foreign investors and their 
enterprises.3 The protection given by customary international law is also seen as 
being not sufficient by foreign investors. ‘Not only did customary international 
law contain no generally accepted rules on the subject, it also lacked a binding 
mechanism to resolve investment disputes.’4 Customary international law 
mainly dwells on the right of the host state to regulate the investment in its 
territory. As far as the right of investors is concerned, what has gained wide 
recognition as part of customary international law is the principle which requires 
host states to respect the property of citizens of other states, at least to the extent 
that the expropriating state has a duty to compensate the foreign owner.5
1 Norbert Horn (2004), Arbitration and the Protection of Foreign Investment: Concepts 
and Means, in Norbert Horn and Stefan Kroll, (eds), Arbitrating Foreign Investment 
Disputes, (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands), p 7.
2 Ibid.
3 Jeswald W. Salacuse (1990), BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 International 
Lawyer, p. 659.
4 Id., p. 660.
5 Brownlie (1998), Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 5th ed.), p. 535.
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Moreover, there has been absence of a rapid development of international law to 
meet the needs of foreign investment.6
The other alternative resorted to by many states for protecting and promoting 
foreign investment is a bilateral investment treaty (BiT). BiTs aim at protecting 
and promoting foreign investment between the contracting States Parties by 
granting a number of rights to foreign investors.7 The development of BITs 
began in the 18th century with the signing of treaties of friendship, navigation 
and commerce (FNC). The signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 
1782 between France and the United States8 marked the start of bilateral trade 
relations. The primary concern of FNCs was trade relations as they were 
designed at a time when commerce was largely restricted to trading in goods by 
merchants and did not contemplate direct investment by corporations.9 The 
treaties also extend to military matters. When we look into investment 
protection by the treaties, the provisions mainly focused on the protection of 
property in the country of another party.10 Alien treatment, including freedom of 
worship and travel within the host state, was also included in the FCN.11 The 
treaties of FCN were used by countries until modern bilateral investment treaties 
emerged since the beginning of the 1960s.
Following the signing of the first modern BIT between West Germany and 
Pakistan in 1959, the conclusion of BITs has been one of the most active areas 
of public international law making in the last decades.12 By the end of 2013, the 
total number of BITs signed reached 2,857 while the number of other 
International Investment Agreements (IIAs) reached 339.13 The fact that these 
bilateral investment treaties can be negotiated in such a manner to suit the 
mutual interests of the parties14 and the absence of a comprehensive multilateral 
agreement on the area contributed to the popularity of the BITs.
6 M. Sornarajah (2010) The International Law on Foreign Investment, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 3rd ed), p. 184.
7 Stephan W. Schill (2009), Multilateralizing Investment Treaties through Most- 
Favored-Nation Clauses, 27 Berkley Journal of International Law 2, p. 498.
8 Alireza Falsafi (2008-2009), Regional Trade and Investment Agreements: Liberalizing 
Investment in a Preferential Climate, 36 Syracuse Journal of International Law and 
Commerce, pp. 45-46.
9 Sornarajah, supra note 6, p. 209.
10 Falsafi, supra note 8, p. 46.
11 Sornarajah supra note 6, p. 210.
12 Salacuse, supra note 3, p 655.
13 UNCTAD (2013), World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment 
and Trade for Development, (United Nations Publication, Geneva), p 101.
14 Sornarajah, supra note 6, p. 183.
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One of the issues raised in connection with the proliferation of BITs is the 
effect of these BITs on the flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the 
signatory countries, especially developing countries. It has been said that BITs 
boost the confidence of investors which in turn will increase the flow of FDI to 
host states. This is so as BITs guarantee certain rights of foreign investors which 
will encourage the foreign investors to invest in that country.15 These guarantees 
are believed to be credible as they provide an important procedural guarantee 
which allows investors to have the enforceable right to unilaterally initiate 
binding international arbitration against the host state that breaches its 
substantive promises of favorable treatment.16 And again, States with a record of 
nationalization see such treaties as cure for their past deeds.17
There are, however, also claims which shed doubt on this effect of BITs on 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Authors like Sornarajah argue that it is 
empirically untestable whether states will receive more investments if they 
conclude such treaties.18 Salacuse and Sullivan also hold a similar view and 
attribute increase in flow of FDI to local political and economic conditions and 
government policies than BITs.19 Attributing increase in flow of FDI to BITs 
implies that the investors are aware and take into account the presence or 
absence of such treaties at the pre-investment stage, which in most cases is not 
true as many potential investors have little awareness or appreciation of specific 
BITs.20 And again it is wrong to assume that BITs are necessary to resolve the 
problem of credible commitment as investors have, for a long time, preferred to 
secure their interests through investment contracts which provide deal-specific 
promise that are more detailed and precise than the one-size-fits-all promise 
provided in BITs.21
Whatever the effect of these treaties on FDI, the uncontested fact is that 
many developing countries signed them with developed as well as other 
developing countries. Ethiopia is no exception. In an effort to attract foreign 
investment, the government of Ethiopia has signed BITs with developed, as well
15 Salacuse, supra note 3, p. 673.
16 Jason Webb Yackee (October 2007), Do BITs Really Work? Revisiting the Empirical 
Link between Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment, University of 
Wisconsin Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1054, p 4.
17 Sornarajah, supra note 6, p. 187.
18 Ibid.
19 Jeswald W. Salacuse and Nicholas P. Sullivan (2005), Do BITs Really Work?: An 
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 Harvard 
International Law Journal, p. 96.
20 Yackee, supra note 16, p. 5.
21 Id., p. 6.
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as developing countries. By the end of 2012, the country had signed 29 BITs.22 
Out of the top ten countries which were the main sources of FDI to Ethiopia in 
2011/201223, Ethiopia has signed BITs with eight, namely Turkey, India, the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Sudan, China, Germany and Italy. The remaining 
two countries, the United States (US) and Qatar, are among the main sources of 
FDI even if they have not signed BITs with Ethiopia.
The structure of all BITs exhibits a striking similarity. They all contain a 
preambular statement which reiterates the aim of the treaty as the reciprocal 
encouragement and protection of investment. A definitional section which 
identifies the types of property protected is also included. The standard of 
treatment of the investor or the investment or both, standard of compensation as 
well as procedure for settlement of disputes also comprises part of the BITs. 
These standard contents in all the BITs are similar, but the wordings in which 
the statements are crafted have variation. It is this variation in the statements 
contained in the different BITs signed by a single country which at times leads 
to controversies. The focus of this article is on two aspects of these BITS: 
standard of treatment, particularly the Most Favored Nation Clause (MFN) and 
its interaction with dispute settlement provisions of the BIT.
2. MFN Clauses in International Investment Agreements: 
Nature, Purpose and Scope
The Most Favored Nation (MFN) clauses in international agreements entail an 
obligation of non discrimination on their signatories. Under these clauses, the 
signatories of a treaty agree to accord each other the same treatment they grant 
to any other nation. MFN treatment is “such treatment accorded by the granting 
state to the beneficiary state, or to persons or things in a determined relationship 
with that state, not less favorable than treatment extended by the granting state 
to a third state, or to persons or things in the same relationship as that third 
state.”24
It is believed that the first written MFN clause was contained in a treaty 
dated 8 November 1226, under which Emperor Frederick II conceded to the city
22 UNCTAD, supra note 13, p. 231.
23 Ethiopian Business Review, Top ten FDI Sources in Ethiopia in 2011/2012, (2013), 
available at http://www.ethiopianbusinessreview.com/index.php/statistics/item/88- 
top-10-fdi-sources-in-ethiopia-in-2011-12.
24 Alejandro Faya Rodriguez (2008), The Most Favored Nation Treatment Clause in 
International Investment Agreements: A tool for Treaty Shopping?, 25 Journal of 
International Arbitration 1, p. 90.
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of Marseilles the privileges previously granted to citizens of Pisa and Genoa.25 
The origin of the modern MFN clauses can be traced back to the 15th century, 
but they became common features of many friendship, commerce and 
navigation treaties during the 18th and 19th centuries.26 These early clauses were 
conditional as the benefits granted by one state were dependent on the granting 
of the same concessions by the beneficiary state.27
This trend was however changed with the adoption of the unconditional 
MFN obligation under the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) in 
1947. Even now, the unconditional MFN clause is the pillar of the World 
Trading System as its application extends beyond the original coverage of trade 
in goods to include trade in services and trade related aspects of intellectual 
property rights. (Article 2 of GATS and article 4 of TRIPS agreements). The 
MFN clause was also contained in the first BIT concluded between Germany 
and Pakistan in 1959.28 Subsequently concluded BITs and other International 
Investment Agreements (IIAs) also contained the clause to ensure that there is 
no discrimination among investors and investments, regardless of their origin. 
Their application may be limited to pre-establishment or may also include post­
establishment activities.
The operation of MFN clauses in international law presupposes a relationship 
of at least three States: State A (the granting State) enters into an obligation vis­
a-vis State B (the beneficiary State) to extend rights and benefits granted in a 
specific context to any third State C. The consequence of the MFN clause in the 
treaty between A and B (basic treaty) is that State B can invoke and rely on all 
benefits State A grants vis-a-vis State C (in the comparator treaty) as long as the 
granted benefit is within the scope of application of the MFN clause in the 
relationship between A and B.29
Some of the major characteristics of MFN clauses include its relative nature 
and the fact that it covers both de jure and de facto discrimination based on 
nationality.30 Its relative nature is explained by the fact that a comparison has to
25
26
27
28
29
30
Chris Newmark and Edward Poulton (January 2005), Most Favored Clause: Is the 
Siemens V Argentina Decision the High-Water Mark?, 20 Mealy’s International 
Arbitration Report 1, p. 39.
UNCTAD (2010), Most Favoured Nation Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreements I, (United Nations Publication, Geneva), p 9 see 
also Jurgen Kurtz (December 2004), The MFN Standard and Foreign Investment: an 
Uneasy Fit?, 5 Journal of World Investment and Trade 6, p. 863.
Id., p. 10.
Id., p 12.
Stephan Schill (2009), The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, 
(Cambridge University Press), p. 126.
Rordiguez, supra note 24, p. 92.
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be made between two foreign investors or investments to determine existence of 
discrimination. As far as the second characteristic is concerned, it relates to the 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality, suggesting the 
possibility of discrimination on other objective grounds. Moreover, the principle 
of MFN applies where like circumstances or conditions exist, relieving the 
contracting parties from treating investors equally in different objective 
situations.31 The other very important characteristic is the fact that the MFN 
clause is governed by the Ejusdem Generis principle. This principle requires that 
the MFN obligation applies to issues belonging to the same subject matter or the 
same category of subjects to which the clause relates.32 In International 
investment Agreements, the subject matter is investment while the subjects are 
the investors. Hence, a beneficiary investor may invoke a benefit via the MFN 
treatment only in regards to the benefits granted to investors and investments of 
third state.
These MFN clauses in International Investment Agreements serve various 
purposes, one of which is “giving investors a guarantee against certain forms of 
discrimination by host countries, and establishing equality of competitive 
opportunities between investors from different foreign countries.”33 Their 
inclusion in BITs will put investors from different foreign countries on equal 
playing field. MFN clauses also protect the value of concessions made between 
the contracting parties to the basic treaty. It upholds the bargain that States 
struck by preventing each of them from hollowing out the content of the basic 
treaty by granting more favorable protection to a third State and thus making 
investments from the original treaty partner comparably less attractive.34
The other important function of an MFN clause is stabilizing expectations 
over time so as to reassure investors about making long term investments.35 
With the MFN clauses, the investors will be assured that they will not be driven 
out of business due to grant of more favorable conditions for competitor investor 
in the future. Their existence ensures that whatever favorable condition is 
granted to the latter investor, will also be available for the previous ones. MFN 
treatment also has broader implications for the structure of international 
relations in implementing equal treatment among nations as such clause 
prevents states from forming economic alliances to the detriment and to the
31 Ibid.
32 UNCTAD, supra note 26, p. 24.
33 UNCTAD (1999), Most Favoured Nation Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreements, (United Nations Publication, Geneva), p 1.
34 Schill, supra note 29, p. 128.
35 Scott Vesel (2007), Clearing a Path Through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most Favored 
Nation Clauses and Dispute Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
32 Yale Journal of International Law, p. 142.
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exclusion of other States.36 As a result, the interest of smaller States will be 
protected against the influence of powerful States.
MFN clauses also have a purpose beyond governing investor-state relations. 
MFN clauses multilateralize the bilateral inter-state treaty relationship and 
harmonize the protection of foreign investment in a specific host state.37 This is 
so as the application of the MFN clause in the basic treaty entails the importing 
of more favorable treatments from the comparator treaty to benefit the investor 
from the beneficiary country. That is, the comparator treaty is incorporated by 
reference into the relationship between the state parties to the basic treaty 
without any additional act of transformation.38
This last purpose of MFN clauses gives rise to a debate on its scope in 
relation to its interaction with dispute resolution provisions contained in BITs. 
International tribunals are divided on how to reconcile a BIT’s specific dispute 
resolution mechanism with an MFN clause which allows the investor to invoke 
a more favorable dispute settlement arrangement incorporated in a comparator 
treaty. This division between and among the international tribunals on the issue 
is partly due to the variation in the way in which the clauses are crafted in the 
different BITs.
In most investment treaties, the MFN clause is more general in its wording 
and leaves considerable scope to argue competing interpretations and it is not 
clear whether the MFN treatment they embrace includes only substantive rules 
or extends to dispute settlement as well.39 These BITs simply prohibit both 
contracting parties from according to investments of nationals of the other 
contracting party a less favorable treatment than that accorded to their own 
nationals or nationals of third states.40 Article 3(2) of the BIT between Ethiopia 
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands can be an example in this regard. The 
treaty provides:
Each Contracting Party shall accord to such investments treatment which 
in any case shall not be less favourable than that accorded either to
36 Schill, supra note 29, p. 128.
37 Schill, supra note 7, p 504. Rodriguez, however, argues that the purpose of MFN 
clause is to guarantee equality with respect to competitive conditions and not to 
contribute to harmonizing the procedural and substantive rights of IIAs. See 
Rodriguez supra note 24, p 100.
38 Schill supra note 7, p. 507.
39 Dana H Freyer and David Herlihy (2005), Most Favored Nation Treatment and 
Dispute Settlement in Investment Arbitration: Just How “Favored” is “Most 
Favored”?, 20 Foreign Investment Law Journal 1, p. 60.
40 See also Julie A. Maupin (2011), MFN-Based Jurisdiction In Investor-State 
Arbitration: Is There Any hope For A consistent approach?, 14 Journal of 
International Economic Law 1, p. 165.
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investment of its own nationals or to investments of nationals of any third 
State, whichever is more favourable to the national concerned.
A similar provision is found in the BIT between Ethiopia and Finland. This 
type of clause is a general MFN provision as it is not restricted in its scope to 
any particular part of the treaty containing it.41 in some BiTs, those general 
types of MFN clauses also provide that the most favored nation treatment to 
be enjoyed by the investors will be ‘as regards their management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment, or disposal of their investment.’42 Article 4(2) 
of the Kuwait-Ethiopia43 BITs can be an example. The article states:
Each Contracting State shall accord investors of the other Contracting 
States, as regards any activity carried on in connection with their 
investments including, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, 
disposal or compensation of such investments, treatment not less 
favorable than that which it accords to its own investors or to investors of 
any third state, whichever is the most favorable
The BITs Ethiopia signed with Germany44, Equatorial Guinea45, the State of 
Israel46, Kingdom of Spain47, Republic of Tunisia48, People’s Democratic 
Republic of Algeria49, Islamic Republic of Iran50, and the Republic of Austria51
41 OECD (2005), International Investment Law: A Changing Landscape- A Companion 
Volume to International Investment Perspectives, p. 130.
42 See also Maupin, supra note 40, p. 165.
43 Agreement between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of 
Kuwait for the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investment, signed on 14 
September 1996, entered in to force on 12 November 1998.
44 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, signed on 19 January 2004 entered into force on 4 May 2006.
45 Agreement between the Republic of Equatorial Guinea and the Government of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection 
of Investment signed on 11 June 2009.
46 Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
and the Government of the State of Israel for the Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investment signed on 26 November 2003, entered into force 22 March 
2004.
47 Agreement between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Kingdom 
of Spain on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Signed on 17 
March 2009.
48 Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
and the Government of the Republic of Tunisia for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investment signed on 14 December 2000, entered into force 2 October 2004.
49 Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
and the Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria on the
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contain similarly worded provisions. Such clauses are general in that they do not 
define the precise meaning of the word ‘treatment’; nor do they specify the 
scope of the MFN obligation.50 51 52 It is also not clear if the favorable treatment for 
the ‘management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of the investment’ 
would include dispute resolution provisions. In this regard, different tribunals 
have reached at different conclusions as to whether dispute resolution provisions 
may be considered to be a normal part of the ‘management, use, enjoyment or 
disposal’ of investment.53
Some BITs are drafted broadly and they provide either explicitly or 
implicitly that the MFN clauses apply to dispute resolution provisions. Such 
clauses contain a sweeping language which indicates that the BIT’s MFN 
commitment applies to ‘all matters’ covered in the treaty.54 For example, 
Article 4(1) of the BIT signed between Ethiopia and the Belgian-Luxembourg 
Economic Union55 reads:
In all matters relating to the treatment of investments, the investors of 
each Contracting Party shall enjoy national treatment or most-favoured­
nation treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party.56
Although some other BITs do not have such phrase as ‘all matters’ it would still 
be considered as broad since they specifically mention that the MFN
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Signed on 4 June 2002, entered 
into force 1 November 2005.
50 Agreement of Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the 
Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Signed on 21 October 2003, entered into force 15 
December 2005.
51 Agreement between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Republic of 
Austria on the Promotion and Protection of Investment signed on 12 November 2004 
entered into force 1 November 2005.
52 Maupin, supra note 40, p. 165.
53 Ibid.
54 Id., p. 163.
55 Agreement between the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on the Promotion and Protection of Investment 
signed on 26 October 2006.
56 Agreement between the Belgian Luxembourg Economic Union and the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, signed on 26 October 2006, article 4(1).
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commitment extends to dispute resolution provisions as well. Article 3 of the 
UK-Ethiopia57 BIT, for instance, provides:
1. Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investments or 
returns of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party to 
treatment less favourable than that which it accords to investments or 
returns of its own nationals or companies or to investments or returns 
of nationals or companies of any third State.
2. Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject nationals or 
companies of the other Contracting Party, as regards their 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their 
investments, to treatment less favourable than that which it accords to 
its own nationals or companies or to nationals or companies of any 
third State.
3. Except provided otherwise in this Agreement and for the avoidance 
of doubt, it is confirmed that the treatment provided for in paragraphs 
(1) and (2) above shall apply to the provisions of Articles 1 to 10 of 
this Agreement.
Article 8 of the agreement deals with dispute settlement between an investor and 
the host state. Thus, the provision contains a broad MFN clause as it is 
applicable with regard to the settlement of investor-state investment disputes.
There is also a possibility for the granting state and the beneficiary state to 
draft the MFN clause narrowly and limit in the basic treaty the extent of the 
favors that can be claimed by the beneficiary.58 This narrowly drafted MFN 
clause in the basic treaty will exclude dispute settlement provision/s from the 
scope of the MFN clause. And again, the scope of the MFN clause might be 
narrowed down subsequent to entry into force of the BiT through exchange of 
interpretative note by the signatories or inclusion of ‘vanishing footnote’. 
Retrospective interpretation of the MFN clause in a restrictive manner through 
exchange of note was resorted to by Argentina and Panama in which they stated 
that the MFN clause will not be applicable to dispute resolution and that ‘this 
has always been their intention’.’59 In the Central America (Dominican 
Republic-United States) Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the parties to the
57 Agreement between the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the Promotion 
and protection of investment, signed on 19 November 2009.
58 OECD, supra note 41, p. 142.
59 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer (2008), Principles of International Investment 
Law, (Oxford University Press), pp. 187-188.
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agreement inserted a footnote to the negotiating history limiting the scope of the 
MFN clause.60
Though the classical approach in drafting MFN clauses is the one which 
combines MFN treatment with national treatment,61 there are also some BITs 
which tie the MFN treatment to Fair and Equitable treatment (FET).62 Those 
BITs which tie MFN to FET provide in one paragraph the requirement to extend 
FET to the investor from the other contracting party and add another paragraph 
which specifies that the FET shall not be less favorable than that provided to the 
investors from a third state. Article 3 of the BIT between Ethiopia and China63 
provides:
1. Investments and activities associated with investments of investors of 
either Contracting Party shall be accorded fair and equitable treatment 
and shall enjoy protection in the territory of the other Contracting Party
2. The treatment and protection referred to in paragraph 1 of this article 
shall not be less favorable than that accorded to investments and 
activities associated with such investments of investors of any third state.
The BITs Ethiopia signed with Russia64 and Libya Arab Jamahiriya65 contain 
similarly worded provisions. These types of clauses present confusion as they tie
60 Maupin supra note 40, p 167. The added foot note reads as:
‘The MFN Treatment article of this Agreement is expressly limited in its scope to 
matters ‘with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investment.’ The parties share the 
understanding and intent that this clause does not encompass international dispute 
resolution mechanisms such as those contained in Section C of this chapter, and 
therefore could not reasonable lead to a conclusion similar to that of the Maffezini 
case. See Id., note 43 and Andreas R. Ziegler, (2010), ‘The Nascent International 
Law on the Most Favored Nation (MFN) Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs), 1 European Yearbook of International Economic Law, p 93.
61 Dolzer and Schreuer, supra note 59, p. 187.
62 The Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) is an objective standard of treatment. 
Though the concept lacks precise definition, the elements of the content of the 
standard as fleshed out by arbitral tribunals include transparency and protection of 
investor’s legitimate expectation, prohibition of manifest arbitrariness, protection 
against denial of justice and due process, freedom from coercion and harassment and 
the requirement of good faith on the part of the host state.
63 Agreement between the government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
and the government of the People’s Republic of China concerning the encouragement 
and reciprocal protection of investment, signed on 11 May 1998 entered in to force 
on 1 May 2000.
64 Agreement between the government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Promotion and Reciprocal
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the relative standard of MFN with the objective standard of FET and it is not 
clear in what way the two are supposed to interact.65 66
3. Types of MFN Questions
The wording used in the drafting of MFN clauses varies from one BIT to 
another. While, the interpretation of the MFN clause by international 
jurisprudence is not a recent development, most of the international investment 
dispute settlement practice addressed the MFN standard with regard to 
substantive rights.67 However, more recent investment case law also dealt with 
the question whether the MFN standard should apply to dispute settlement
procedures.68
There are generally three scenarios in which an MFN clause within a BIT 
may be invoked. Under the first scenario, the beneficiary of an MFN clause 
invokes the MFN clause in order to obtain the benefit of some more favorable 
substantive treatment that has been granted by the host state to a third state’s 
investment via the host state’s domestic legislation or regulation.69 Here the 
MFN clause of a BIT is invoked to import the more favorable treatment which is 
granted to another investor under the domestic legislation of the host state. In 
the second scenario, the claimant invokes the basic treaty’s MFN clause in order 
to import into the treaty the more favorable substantive protections that have 
been granted by the host state to a third state’s investor by the comparator 
treaty.70 Here the investor is relying on the MFN clause of the basic treaty to 
import a favorable treatment from the comparator treaty to the basic treaty. 
Today, several investment tribunals have accepted the possibility of importing 
more favorable substantive protection from a comparator treaty to the basic
Protection of Investments, signed on 10 February 2000, entered into force 6 June 
2000.
65 Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
and the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on 27 January 
2004, entered into force 25 June 2004.
66 Maupin, supra note 40, p. 166.
67 Most Favoured Nation Treatment Application in International Investment Arbitration 
A Study on Conflicting Precedence in International Dispute Settlement Procedure, 
(2001), University of Oslo, p 4, available at:
<https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/22714/Master_thesis.pdf7sequenceM>
68 UNCTAD (2007), Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rule 
Making, (United Nations Publication, Geneva), p. 52.
69 Maupin, supra note 40, p. 159.
70 Ibid.
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treaty.71 For instance, in the first known investment treaty arbitration, Asian 
Agricultural Products versus Sri Lanka, the Tribunal accepted the principle that 
an investor covered by the basic treaty could rely on more favorable substantive 
conditions granted under another BIT of the host State.72 The tribunals in Pope 
& Talbot versus Canada and MTD versus Chile cases are few of the other 
tribunals which allowed the incorporation of substantive rights from third 
country BITs through MFN clause to the basic treaty.73
The third scenario in which an MFN clause may be invoked relates to the 
importation of more favourable dispute resolution provisions from a comparator 
treaty to the basic treaty. There are potentially four sets of questions that may 
arise in investor-state arbitration in this regard.
3.1 Changes to Arbitral Procedure
The first set of ‘MFN’ claims under investment dispute settlement practice 
involves circumstances by which a claimant investor will attempt to override 
procedural obstacles under the basic treaty using the BITs MFN clause to use 
more preferable procedural terms that exist in another comparator BIT.74 The 
procedural hurdle that the claimant wants to avoid could relate to the use of 
domestic court as forum for settlement of the dispute or longer consultation 
period before resorting to arbitration or adjudication. Much dispute settlement 
jurisprudence has been set in this regard. The first of these issues was decided 
following the landmark arbitration in Maffezini versus Spain,75 although this 
tribunal was actually not the first to face this issue.76 In Maffezini, the Argentine
71 Emmanuel Gaillard, (2005), Establishing Jurisdiction through A Most-Favored- 
Nation Clause, International Arbitration Law, 233 New York Law Journal 105.
72 Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka, Final Award, June 27, 1990, Para 54, 
However, the investor in this case did not prevail on the more favorable conditions 
because the investor could not show that the Swiss-Sri Lankan BIT provided for a 
stricter liability standard of the host State compared with the British-Sri Lankan BIT. 
See Schill supra note 29, p. 140.
73 Nonetheless, there are also cases in which the importation of favorable substantive 
rights from comparator treaty has been controversial. For more on this please see 
UNCTAD supra note 26.
74 Maupin, supra note 40, p. 168.
75 Emilio Agustin Maffezini and the Kingdom Of Spain, Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision 
of The Tribunal On Objections To Jurisdiction, 2000.
76 This question was extensively discussed in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, 
where the International Court of Justice determined that the basic treaty upon which 
the Claimant could rely was that “containing the most-favored-nation clause”. - 
International Court of Justice, Reports, 1952, at 109. Also see the Case concerning 
the rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco. International 
Court of Justice, Reports, 1952, p. 191.
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investor in Spain was allowed to use a more beneficial time requirement in the 
arbitration process found in the Chile-Spain BIT (as opposed to the Argentina- 
Spain BiT under which the claim was filed). The tribunal accepted application 
of the MFN principle, subject to the limitation that it did not override public 
policy considerations of the parties to the negotiations. 77 The tribunal stated:
56. ... if a third party treaty contains provisions for the settlement of 
disputes that are more favorable to the protection of the investor’s rights and 
interests than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be extended to 
the beneficiary of the most favored nation clause as they are fully 
compatible with the ejusdem generis principle. Of course, the third-party 
treaty has to relate to the same subject matter as the basic treaty, be it the 
protection of foreign investments or the promotion of trade, since the dispute 
settlement provisions will operate in the context of these matters; otherwise 
there would be a contravention of that principle. This operation of the most 
favored nation clause does, however, have some important limits arising 
from public policy considerations [.]78
Similarly, subsequent investment tribunals have been faced mostly with the 
question of whether MFN clauses allow an investor to rely on shorter waiting 
periods in third-country BiTs or to do away with the requirement to pursue local 
remedies for a limited time before initiating investor-State arbitration. 
Accordingly, until today, arbitral jurisprudence has consistently accepted that 
investors may circumvent such ‘admissibility-related’ requirements by relying 
on more favorable provisions for investor-State dispute settlement under a 
comparator BIT.79 In this respect, “MFN clauses have been held to 
multilateralize access to investment treaty arbitration.”80 The issue has been 
“applied as one principle of international investment law that has been
77 Maffezini v. Spain ARB/97/7, decision on Jurisdiction. Also see UNCTAD, (2005), 
Investor-State Disputes Arising From Investment Treaties: A Review, Series on 
International Investment Policies for Development, (United Nations Publication, 
Geneva).
78 Id., Para 56.
79 Perhaps the only exception in this regard is the arbitral ruling in wintershall where 
the tribunal did not agree to the possibility of circumventing an 18 month cooling 
period before the investor could lodge claims under international arbitration. In 
reaching this conclusion the tribunal stated that “That the eighteen-month 
requirement of a proceeding in a local court constitutes a necessary preliminary step 
to an ICSID arbitration under the Argentina-Germany BIT is apparent from the text 
of Article 10 itself.” And thus the state’s consent must be explicit and cannot be 
inffereed. Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/14,( November 8, 2008).
80 Schill, supra note 29, p. 145.
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incorporated in the pertinent BIT and is independent of the exact wording of the 
MFN clause in question.”81
Accordingly, this issue brings three different scenarios of ‘treaty shopping’ 
to our attention whereby an investor can possibly use BITs signed by Ethiopia, 
other than the investor’s home state, to benefit from treaty obligations entered 
by Ethiopia with other partners.
a) Shorter consultation periods:
The first cases that one can make out of the present circumstance of arbitral 
practice against the contents of BITs signed by Ethiopia involves the length of 
time periods which an investor has to wait for to challenge the state action under 
the established dispute settlement framework of the particular BIT.82 These 
issues involve a scenario where the basic treaty provides for particular 
conditions before an international arbitration proceeding can be initiated, for 
example, a cooling-off period varying from three to six months or sometimes 
the exhaustion of local remedies. Simply, the question is whether an MFN 
clause can be invoked to benefit from the more favorable conditions of a third- 
party treaty?83
While almost all BITs signed by Ethiopia reviewed for the purpose of this 
article set a consultation time period of six months,84 the bilateral investment 
treaty signed by Ethiopia with UK, Finland and South Africa provide for a 
shorter, three months, waiting period of consultation before a dispute can be 
submitted either to national courts or international arbitration tribunal as the 
case may be. Article 8 of the UK-Ethiopia BIT reads as follows:
ARTICLE 8: Settlement of Disputes between an Investor and a Host State
Any dispute between a national or company of one Contracting Party and 
the other Contracting Party concerning an obligation of the latter under this 
Agreement in relation to an investment of the former which has not been 
amicably settled shall, after a period of three months from written 
notification of a claim, be submitted to the competent courts or 
administrative tribunals of the Contracting Party, to the dispute, or to
81 Ibid.2 Most BITs often require that investors wait for a certain period of time, a ‘cooling 
off period of usually three or six months, before commencing arbitration. C. Ignacio 
Suarez Anzorena and William K. Perry (2010), Protecting Foreign Investments and 
Arbitration, In-House Defense Quarterly, p. 60.
83 Gaillard, supra note 71.
84 For instance see BIT between Germany and Ethiopia Article 11 sub 2; Ethiopia and 
Russian federation Art 8 sub 2; Ethiopia and Sudan Art 8 sub 2.
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international arbitration if the national or company concerned so wishes.85 
[Emphasis added]
Even more so, the Ethio-Austria BiT provides for sixty days (two month) 
waiting period before a dispute can be submitted to the appropriate organs. 
Article 12(2) of the treaty provides that a dispute ‘may be submitted for 
resolution [...] after 60 days from the date notice of intent to do so was provided 
to the Contracting Party, party to the dispute [.]86
Thus, one can see that few BITs signed by Ethiopia provide for a three month 
or less waiting period while virtually all BITs provide for a 6 month waiting 
periods of ‘consultation’. Accordingly, it seems that investors from other BITs 
can base their claim under their basic treaty’s MFN provisions to claim a more 
preferable (shorter waiting/consultation period) as included under the Ethiopia- 
UK, South Africa, Finland or even more the Ethio-Austria BIT.
b) Agreement of the State:
Another interesting case to note is the scenario where the basic treaty contains a 
dispute settlement clause but no choice is given to the investor as regards the 
type of arbitration, notably institutional arbitration such as the International 
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).87 Hence the difficult 
question would be whether the MFN clause can be invoked to seek the benefit 
of ‘investor’s-option’ offered in a third-party treaty?88
The only instance in this regard under BITs signed by Ethiopia is the manner 
of submitting dispute claims to an international arbitration under the Ethio- 
Denmark BIT. 89 Under this agreement90, despite a clear invocation by the terms
85 Art 8 of the BIT between Ethiopia and UK.
86 Paragraph 1(c) of article 12 deals with settlement of investment dispute using 
arbitration at ICSID or ICSID Additional Facility, sole arbitrator or ad hoc arbitral 
tribunal established under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL) or the International Chamber of 
Commerce, by a sole arbitrator or an ad hoc Tribunal under its Rules of Arbitration.
87 It is the argument of the authors that the limitations defined by the Maffezini Tribunal 
don’t cover this matter. The limitations set by that tribunal covered such “public 
policy considerations” as the exhaustion of local remedies, the stipulation of a fork- 
in-the-road clause (i.e., an irreversible option offered to the investor between the 
courts of the host state and international arbitration), the provision of a particular 
arbitration forum such as ICSID, or the parties’ agreement to have a highly 
institutionalized system of arbitration-such as NAFTA.
88 Gaillard, supra note 71.
89 Agreement between the Federal Democratic of Ethiopia and the Kingdom of 
Denmark Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
signed on 24 April 2001 entered into force 21 August 2005.
90 Also see the BIT between Ethiopia and South Africa, which provides:
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of the treaty that the investor can chose to submit its claim between the local 
courts of the host sate and an international arbitration tribunal, it seems that the 
agreement of the concerned parties is required to submit the case to any of 
arbitration panels listed under Art 9 Sub 2 lit a-c, thus at the same time limiting 
the investor’s choice of forum.
Article 9: Settlement of disputes between a Contracting Party and an 
investor of the other Contracting Party
2. Where the dispute is referred to international arbitration, parties in the
dispute may agree to refer the dispute either to:
a) the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) ...
b) the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
under the rules governing Additional Facility ...
c) an international ad hoc tribunal. [Emphasis added]
This seems to be a ‘weak obligation’ as the word ‘may’ does not constitute a 
strong obligation. But in any case, if one considers this to be an ‘obstacle’ for a 
Danish investor against submitting the case for international arbitration, it 
certainly brings an interesting thought with regard to what an arbitration panel 
would decide if a claim was brought to it without securing an agreement from its 
host counterpart, by merely basing its claim on an MFN provision which this 
basic treaty contains and thereby asking to benefit from other BITs signed by 
Ethiopia which do not require such type of prerequisites.
(2) Where the dispute is referred to international arbitration, the investor and the
Party concerned in the dispute may agree to refer the dispute either to:
(a) The International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature at 
Washington DC on 18 March 1965. As long as this requirement is not met, 
each Party agrees that the dispute may be settled under the rules governing 
the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the 
Secretariat of ICSID; or
(b) an international arbitrator or ad hoc arbitration tribunal to be established by 
agreement between the Parties to the dispute.
(3) If after a period of three months from written notification of the investor’s 
decision to refer the dispute to international arbitration there is no agreement on 
one of the alternative procedures referred to in sub-article (2), the dispute shall, at 
the written request of the investor concerned, be dealt with in terms of the 
procedure preferred by the investor.
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c) ‘Period of limitation’:
Finally under Austria-Ethiopia BIT there is a limitation against admissibility of 
a 5 year period of limitation which is not included in other BITs. Article 12(2) 
of the BiT states:
A dispute may be submitted for resolution pursuant to paragraph 1(c) of 
this Article after 60 days from the date notice of intent to do so was 
provided to the Contracting Party, party to the dispute, but not later than 
five years from the date the investor first acquired or should have 
acquired knowledge of the events which gave rise to the dispute.
Accordingly, an interesting question to bring to a hypothetical panel’s attention 
is whether an Austrian investor can use the MFN provision in the Austria- 
Ethiopia BIT and claim a more preferable treatment whereby his claims would 
not be barred by period of limitation as almost all BITs signed by Ethiopia do 
not provide such kind of ‘obstacle’.
3.2- Expansion of subject-matter-scope of arbitral clause
These sorts of claims involve applications by an investor to broaden the limited 
subject matter coverage of the basic treaty by embedding more extensive subject 
matter coverage of a comparator BIT. This category comprises attempts to 
overcome the limited subject matter jurisdiction granted to a tribunal under a 
basic treaty’s dispute resolution clause by importing, via MFN clause, the 
broader subject matter jurisdiction granted under a comparator treaty.91
The relevance of this issue would have been moot had the BITs signed by 
Ethiopia followed consistent approach while marking the scope of dispute 
settlement mechanisms and choice of dispute settlement institutions. But this is 
not the case. Among the 28 BITs reviewed for the purpose of this article, two 
appear to be distinct concerning this issue. In particular, review of the BIT 
signed between Ethiopia and China indicate that the reference to international 
arbitration panels is limited only in cases where the subject matter of dispute is 
the amount of compensation. Article 9(3) of the BIT states:
If a dispute involving the amount of compensation for expropriation cannot 
be settled within six months after resort to negotiations as specified in 
Paragraph 1 of this article, it may be submitted at the request of either party 
to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal or arbitration under the auspices of ICSID....
91 Maupin, supra note 40, p. 170.
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An award on jurisdiction between RosInvest Co. UK Ltd vs. The Russian 
Federation 92 has permitted an investor to avail itself of the most-favoured 
nation clause in the underlying BIT between the Soviet Union and the United 
Kingdom, 93 in order to extend the tribunal’s jurisdiction to issues of occurrence 
and validity of expropriation, which were not covered by the limited jurisdiction 
clause in the BIT. Through the applicable MFN clause, the tribunal based its 
jurisdiction on the broader jurisdiction clause in the BIT between Denmark and 
the Russian Federation.94 It was the first award which set a potential milestone 
for future jurisprudence which enables a tribunal to employthe MFN clause to 
extend its jurisdiction to categories of claims excluded by the jurisdiction clause 
of the applicable BIT as the interpretation of the MFN clause had previously 
been rejected in Plama Consortium Ltd v. Bulgaria,95 and Telenor Mobile 
Communications A.S. v. Republic of Hungary. 96
Most recently, however, the Austrian Airlines versus Slovakia award has 
reiterated the latter position.97 In this award, the panel found that it has the 
mandate to interpret the provisions of the underlying BIT "neither restrictively 
nor expansively but rather objectively and in good faith" and thus while it is 
acceptable to rely on the MFN clause to benefit from certain advantageous 
dispute settlement clauses contained in other treaties it however rejected the 
possibility for an investor, by relying on the MFN clause, to seek to extend the 
arbitral jurisdiction of the panel to matters not covered under the agreement. 
According to the panel, “Taken in context, Article 3(1) is not a neutral MFN 
clause. The Contracting States have confined recourse to arbitration to clearly 
defined categories of disputes. This is particularly evident for expropriation 
claims. It is also clear for disputes over transfer obligations. Seen in interaction 
with the express limitations which the Treaty imposes on arbitration, the general
92 RosInvestCo Uk Ltd. Vs The Russian Federation, Case No. Arbitration Award V 
079/2005, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award on 
Jurisdiction (October 2007).
93 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (UK-Soviet BIT) signed in 
1989.
94 UNCTAD, (2008), Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 
International Investment Agreements MONITOR, No. 1.
95 (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 2005).
96 (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, 2006) Also See UNCTAD, supra note 86.
97 Austrian Airlines v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Finaly Award October 9, 
2009. < http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0048_0.pdf >
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intent manifested in the MFN clause is insufficient to displace such 
limitations.98 99
Another reassurance for Ethiopia might be the fact that the tribunal in 
Rosinvest case decided to expand its subject matter jurisdiction based on a 
general MFN clause of the BIT between Soviet Union and UK while the type of 
MFN clause in the Ethiopia-China BIT is tied to FET. It is worth noting that a 
similar approach is used in the BIT between Ethiopia and Libya.
Another possible way of extending the subject matter scope of a tribunal is 
by seeking to import ‘Umbrella Clause’ from the comparator treaty to the basic 
treaty. Umbrella clauses are clauses through which the contracting parties 
assume-as a matter of treaty law-additional substantive and/or procedural 
obligations with regard to undertakings contained in instruments extraneous to 
the treaty. "According to Schill, umbrella clauses create a separate obligation 
under the investment treaty in question to observe obligations the host state has 
assumed in relation to foreign investors, in particular obligations under investor- 
state contracts.100 Hence, an investor that benefits from a BIT which contains an 
umbrella clause can assert violation of the treaty which entails international 
responsibility of the host state that failed to observe commitments entered under 
an investor-state contract. The question then would be whether an in investor 
can attempt to import an umbrella clause from a comparator treaty to the basic 
treaty relying on the MFN clause of the basic treaty.
In the case EDF International S.A. et.al versus Argentina101, the French 
claimant invoked the MFN clause contained in the BIT between Argentina and 
France in order to benefit from the protection of umbrella clauses found in the 
BIT between Argentina and Belgian Luxembourg Economic Union, and 
Argentina and Germany.102 The tribunal in the case concluded that the MFN 
clause permits recourse to the umbrella clauses of third country treaties as it
98 Ibid, para 138. However also see the opinion of the dissenting arbitrator as he stated 
“Article 3(l} of the Treaty, [MNF] according to Austrian investors treatment equal to 
that granted to investors under any third-State treaty of the Slovak Republic, covers 
both substantive and procedural treatment, including the consent to international 
arbitration given by Slovakia under any of its other BITs.” Austrian Airlines v. The 
Slovak Republic, Separate Opinion of Charles N. Brower, p 2. 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0047_0.pdf ,>
99 Tracisio Gazzini and Attila Tanzi (2013), Handle with Care: Umbrella Clauses and 
MFN Treatment in Investment Arbitration, 14 The Journal of World Investment and 
Trade, p. 985.
100 Schill, supra note 29, p. 84.
101 EDF International S.A, SAUR International S.A. and Leon Participaciones 
Argentinas S.A. V. Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/03/23, Award, 11 June 2012.
102 Gazzini and Tanzi, supra note 99, p. 981.
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accords investors anything other than those rights which fall within the limits of 
the subject matter of the clause.103 In another case, Salini vs. Jordan, the 
claimant attempted to import an umbrella clause from a comparator treaty in 
order to bring its contract-based claims before an investor-state tribunal, 
although the basic BIT specifically prohibited contract claims, deferring instead 
to the contractually selected forum.104 The Tribunal, however, declined the 
claim.
When we look into the BITs Ethiopia has signed, some of them contain 
umbrella clauses. One example is Article 8(2) of the Ethiopia-Germany BIT 
which states:
A Contracting Party shall adhere to any other obligation deriving from a 
written commitment undertaken by it in favor of an investor of the other 
Contracting Party with regard to an investment in its territory.
The BITs Ethiopia signed with Denmark and Kuwait also contain umbrella 
clauses, although the wording is different.105 The effect of such umbrella clauses 
is that a contractual obligation which the Ethiopian state entities owe to the 
investors from one of these countries, if not respected, will give rise to treaty 
claim. Investors whose basic treaty contains a general and broad MFN clause, 
but not an umbrella clause, may attempt to import the umbrella clause from any 
one of these comparator treaties. Even if the arbitral jurisprudence is not well 
settled, it still entails some level of uncertainty on the part of the host state.
Tribunals have also given effect to MFN clauses to overcome admissibility 
requirements (such as a requirement to submit disputes initially to local courts 
for an 18 month period).106 However, applying the MFN clause in those cases 
did not actually change the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction agreed upon in 
the BITs or create ‘consent’ to arbitration that was otherwise lacking. It merely 
affected the timing of the host state’s consent to, for example ICSID arbitration, 
and allowed tribunals promptly to hear claims over which they would later have 
jurisdiction in any event.107 The Gas Natural tribunal concluded that;
‘.[u]nless it appears clearly that the state parties to a BIT or the parties to a 
particular investment agreement settled on a different method for resolution
3 EDF International Award, paragraph 934. See also Id., p. 982.
104 See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A v. The 
Hasemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 12 November 2004. See also Maupin, supra note 40, p. 170.
105 Article 2/3 of the Ethiopia-Denmark BIT and article 3/3 of the Ethiopia-Kuwait BIT 
states: ‘Each Contracting party shall observe any commitment it may have entered 
into with regard to investments of investors of the other contracting party. ’
106 Maffezini, Siemens, Camuzzi and Gas Natural.
107 Freyer and Herlihy, supra note 39.
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of disputes that may arise, most-favored-nation provisions in BITs should be 
understood to be applicable to dispute settlement.”108
BITs are usually signed for a specified period of time. But their protection might 
extend to investments established prior to their entry into force based on the 
‘extension of temporal scope of application of arbitral clause’. Such BITs which 
extend their protection to investments established prior to the entry date, 
however, exclude from the coverage those disputes that have emerged before the 
entry into force of the BIT. For example, article 11 of the BIT between Ethiopia 
and China, states ‘...It shall, however, not be applicable to claims arising out of 
events which occurred prior to its entry into force.’ In such circumstances, an 
MFN clause might be invoked to extend the temporal dimension of a basic 
treaty’s dispute resolution provisions.109 In the case Tecmed versus Mexico, the 
claimant relied upon the basic Treaty’s MFN clause to import into the basic 
treaty a retroactive application clause from a comparator treaty signed between 
Mexico and Austria.110 The tribunal, however, did not accept the claimant’s 
request.
It is also important to note changes to arbitral forum or system of dispute 
resolution. This relates to a situation whereby a claimant would rely upon a 
comparator treaty in order to change the forum or displace the entire dispute 
resolution system selected by the basic treaty. 111
4. Some Observations of Arbitral Practice
Generally, the arbitral practice highlights the importance of clearly delimiting 
the scope of application of the MFN clause in the text of these agreements. If 
contracting parties do not intend to extend MFN treatment to dispute settlement 
matters, it would be better for the investment agreement to explicitly say so.112 
Accordingly, the general tenor of the arbitral jurisprudence is that MFN clauses 
allow for the incorporation of more favorable treatment concerning the 
admissibility of an investor-state claim, but do not allow investors to establish or 
to expand the jurisdictional basis for investor-State arbitration based on broader 
consent to arbitration in third-party BITs.113
Yet, the potential case towards a broader treaty interpretation is largely open 
in cases where the contracting parties have expressly stated that the MFN clause
8 Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 2005.
109 Maupin, supra note 40, p. 169.
110 Tecmed vs. Mexico ... see also Ibid.
111 Id., p. 171.
112 UNCTAD, supra note 68, p. 53.
113 Schill, supra note 29, p. 151.
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extends to dispute settlement provisions; absolving the need to inquire into their 
intent as the wording of the treaty is clear and must be given effect.114 In 
particular, the Plama Consortium Tribunal has announced what is considered to 
be a landmark test by commentators. Interestingly, while interpreting the 
requirement for consent to ICSID jurisdiction, the Tribunal stated: ‘It is a well- 
established principle, both in domestic and international law, that such an 
agreement should be clear and unambiguous.’115 The panel further stated: ‘an 
MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate by reference dispute 
settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the 
MFN provision in the basic treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties 
intended to incorporate them.’116 * This implicitly commends that in cases 
whereby the terms of the treaty specifically incorporate treaty provisions 
addressing dispute settlement, there is a clear understanding of the intent of the 
parties to the BIT; it is assumed that they had consented to embed preferable 
terms of dispute settlement included under other BITs entered by one of the
• 117parties.
While Maffezini and Siemens favor the application of MFN status to dispute 
settlement, Salini and Plama say, at least in principle, the opposite, focusing on 
the intention of the parties as the decisive factor. In this view, reference to 
dispute settlement provisions from other treaties will be possible only where the 
parties to the BIT have a clear and unambiguous intention of incorporating it - 
by the operation of the MFN clause.118 The same is true in the opposite scenario, 
where the parties have expressly excluded dispute settlement from the scope of 
an MFN clause, either through the wording of the original treaty or, for 
example, through a common Note of Interpretation.
Accordingly, commentators have already shown that the trend is essentially 
in this latter approach. As Gaillard notes:
‘[T]he interpretation question of whether dispute settlement arrangements 
constitute a substantive right that can be extended to the beneficiary of an 
MFN clause arises when the clause is broadly phrased and the contracting 
parties to the treaty have neither expressly excluded dispute resolution 
mechanisms nor clarified their intention of including such mechanisms in 
the protection that is accorded to the beneficiaries of the clause. In those 
situations, the intention of the contracting parties can reasonably be 
interpreted to include the whole range of the rights accorded to the investors
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of a third country, including the right to the neutral and effective settlement 
of their investment disputes through arbitration rather than through the 
judicial organs of the host state itself.’ 119
A review of Ethiopian BITs indicate that in almost all of the BITs, the MFN 
clause is phrased in highly general terms and leaves considerable leverage to 
raise competing interpretations. In particular, most BITs are silent on whether 
by the MFN treatment they embrace only substantive rules for the protection of 
investments, such as guarantees of fair treatment as discussed above, or extend 
to other ‘procedural protections’ such as dispute settlement. Most of these BITs 
include general wording. The following two clauses from Article 3(2) of the 
Ethiopia-South Africa and Article 3(2) of Ethio-Germany BIT, respectively, 
illustrate this point with regard to the treatments of investments, national 
treatment and MFN treatment:
“Each Party shall in its territory accord to investments and returns of 
investors the other Party treatment as favorable as that which it accords to 
investments and returns of its own investors or to investments and returns 
of investors of any third State”.120
“Neither Contracting Party shall subject investors of the other Contracting 
Party, as regards their activities such as the management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment and disposal of their investments in its territory, to 
treatment less favorable than it accords to its own investors or to investors 
of any third State”.
As discussed above, the implication of these terms is limited in terms of the 
possibility of including procedural protections via the MFN standard. The 
existing arbitral jurisprudence shows that tribunals are reluctant to apply such 
MFN treaty terms. However, there also exists an arbitral jurisprudence which 
shows the likelihood of broad applications of the MFN treatment if the treaty 
language shows an explicit intention of including the dispute settlement 
provisions of the BIT, like the one signed between Ethiopia and UK and 
Ethiopia and Belgian Luxembourg Economic Union. The implication of such an 
overtly stretched use of the MFN provision under the Agreements is that, an 
investor from the capital source state (in this case the UK) can potentially use 
the basic Ethiopia-UK BIT and shop for a more preferable dispute settlement
119 Gaillard, supra note 71, p 3 Also see Emmanuel Gaillard, (2008), (in) Andrea K 
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Investment Law, (British Institute of International and Comparative Law), p 273.
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provision included in other BITs which Ethiopia has concluded now or will do 
so in the future with other states, hence potentially granting the investor the 
ultimate privilege for treaty and/or forum shopping.
Concluding Remarks
Countries sign BITs with the aim of attracting foreign direct investment and 
protecting the foreign investors’ property from host State’s actions. Ethiopia has 
signed 29 BITs with its trading partners. These BITs contain different standards 
of treatment, one of which is the Most Favored Nation treatment. This standard 
guarantees equality between investors of different countries with respect to 
competitive conditions. As discussed in the preceding sections, the dynamism 
in relation to the concept of Most Favored Nation treatment should be noted, in 
particular as raised in relation to the nature or purpose of MFN clauses and its 
interaction with dispute resolution provisions contained in the BITs. To this end, 
the different scenarios are examined whereby a foreign investor can possibly use 
BITs signed by Ethiopia, other than the investor’s home state, to benefit from 
treaty obligations entered by Ethiopia with other partners - ‘treaty shopping’.
A review of Ethiopian BITs indicate that in almost all of the BITs, the MFN 
clause is phrased in highly general terms and leaves considerable leverage to 
raise competing interpretations and creating a matrix of obligations with the 
effect of stretching the Country’s obligations under the respective agreements. 
BITs are signed for a certain period of time. Many of the BITs Ethiopia signed 
have initial minimum period of 10 years while few extend beyond this 
timeframe.121 Depending on what is agreed, the BIT may allow for its automatic 
renewal for indefinite period of time subject to the right of the parties to 
terminate it at any time by giving notice of termination, known as ‘any time 
termination clause’.122 Alternatively, the BIT may provide that it will continue 
to be in force for additional fixed period of time, in which case the treaty can be 
terminated only at the end of each fixed period.123
The fact that such clauses are inserted in the BITs gives the contracting 
parties the opportunity to revisit the BITs. The action taken by the South African 
and Indonesian governments can be taken as example. In September 2012, 
South Africa informed the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union, through a 
notice of termination, that it would not renew the existing BIT which was set to
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expire in March 2013.124 The country also served a notice of termination in 
respect of its BIT with Spain on June 23, 2013125 and latter on to Germany, 
Switzerland and The Netherlands.126 The imprecise provisions contained in the 
old generation BiTs which create uncertainty and unacceptable risk both to 
serious investors and the governments was stated as reason for the decision to 
terminate the BITs.127 Indonesia is also planning to terminate more than 60 
BiTs128 and it has started giving notice of termination. A notice of termination 
was given to terminate the BIT with the Netherlands as of July 1, 2015.129 Some 
argue that this move is an attempt by the Indonesian government to update its 
BITs with a new model that reflects the latest legal technology as the older ones 
tend to contain provisions that protect foreign investors without specifically 
providing for the preservation of government’s policy space to regulate in the 
public interest for health, the environment or for financial reasons.130
Many of the BITs signed by Ethiopia contain ‘any time termination’ clause, 
the ones signed with Kuwait being an exception. Considering the fact that many 
of these BITs entered into force in the early 2000, one can conclude that the 
initial minimum period of many of these BITs has lapsed or is about to lapse. 
This gives the government of Ethiopia a good opportunity to learn from the 
experience of other countries and revisit its BITs with the aim of having a 
coherent investment treaty framework. ______ ■
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